Checking Your (Unearned) Privilege: An Exercise in Intellectual Archaeology

What follows is a short example of what is more generally termed “systematically distorted communication” – a term coined by Jürgen Habermas – a leading figure in the Frankfurt School which is itself a major force in the development of Cultural Marxism. [Aside: The term “cultural marxism” is itself being treated as a form of systematic distortion. For those interested in exploring this thread it is reasonable to begin with the Wikipedia entry here and compare it to the link provided previously.]

This example does not originate with Habermas but comes from an Australian academic who is actively teaching his ideas to his students.

The exercise proposed here deals with the Index (and the index alone) to the book “Undoing Privilege” by Robert Pease published by Zed Books in 2010.

Before going ahead it might be worthwhile to clear up the meaning of the term “intellectual archaeology”.

Regular archaeology uses the material objects left behind by societies to determine what those societies were actually like. Tools, utensils, dwellings, buildings, roads, docks, ships, vehicles can all let us infer things about what kinds of people lived in a place and what their values were.

This presentation of only the index of a book permits a bit of “intellectual archaeology”. The index allows reader to make educated inferences (and these inferences are contingent on the education of the individual making them) about the writer, the writer’s worldview, and the worldview of those who may read it.

If we infer the “personality” of individuals from the way they speak or act, of if we infer the cultural affiliations of individuals from the way they dress or gesture, then we also engage in the intellectual process of theoretically guided inference from  so-called objective evidence.

Carrying out this task inappropriately can lead to charges of “jumping to conclusions”, “stereotyping”, and various kinds of either “-ism” or “-phobia” depending on the inference and the audience.

And how the “audience” infers the motives of the person making the inference.  The social legitimacy for people in specific categories to make  judgements is not symmetrical. Only certain kinds of individuals, for example, are permitted to make specific “-ism” charges. Only certain kinds of individuals, to extend this, are vulnerable to specific “-ism” charges.

That being said we can continue with the exercise.

In the last few years we have been exposed to the phrase “check your privilege”. There are many ways to be privileged. There is also the growing suspicion that the idea of “unearned privilege” may be an application of “partial rationality” because if all “unearned privileges” were simultaneously abolished the resulting set of social relationships would have no history, no path to the future, no plan for progress, and would therefore be an evolutionary dead-end.

The Appendix this post is long. It is the Index (scanned and tidied up reasonably well) to a book which is a veritable litany of all the kinds of “unearned privilege” and many of the groups which have arisen to combat them.

What examining the index allows us to do is gauge not only what is there but what is not there. We can see not only what kind of world the author is trying to build but also the kinds of themes which are sufficiently peripheral or marginal as to require either not mention at all or only negative depictions.

It is not fair, of course, to find fault with the book that was not written.  It is unreasonable to attack a book on poetry for its insufficient discussion of world economics.

What is fair is to examine a book advocating thoroughgoing social change and massive challenges to the existing social order with three questions: (a)where do you want to go? what kind of world do you want to build? (b)how can we get there from here? how long will this journey take and at what cost and who will bear the cost and who will benefit? (c)once this promised land is achieved will it be stable? will human beings as we know them to be through the scientific study of evolution and psychology be able to sustain this kind of society?

Two of the items missing from Pease’s index are “children” and “parents”.  Despite the frequent appeals to moral outrage there is no discussion at all of “ethics” or the need for education of the young (those missing children) into the habits of virtue.  White people are never the victims of racism. Men are never the victims of sexism. While “homophobia” is mentioned no hint to the possibility of “heterophobia” can be found. (My spell checker has put a red underline beneath “heterophobia” but not “homophobia”. No surprise.) Anti-Islamic views are in the index. Anti-Christian views are not there.

The lack of any kind of historical perspective prevents us from asking about any patterns of imperialism, colonialism, or hostility to outsiders other than that shown by White Europeans.

The subtitle of the book is “Unearned Advantage in a Divided World”. This obviously leads to the question of what an “earned advantage” might be. It also dovetails with the question of the missing “family” idea. The word “family” only shows up in the book as the name of the Dulwich Family Centre. What a “family” is does not factor into any analysis in this book despite the fact that some “privileges” are “inherited” because they were “earned” by the parents and the children inherited them.

Words such as “property” and “inheritance” as well as “culture” are missing.  Patriarchy is prominent but matriarchy is likewise absent.

Is this book in any way an attempt to describe a single “better world” to which we might aspire to travel? Or is it just a shopping list of grievances rooted in emotion, devoid of ethical coherence, and fully resistant to logical reconciliation?

I could go on. But I’ll let the Index speak for itself.  The overarching questions relate to what terms are not defined, what relationships not examined, and  what possible future scenarios are not entertained. The “margins” of the narrative tell us as much by what is excluded as what is kept in.

APPENDIX

Index

able-bodied gaze, 161

able-bodied privilege, 143-4; construction of, 157-60

able-bodied/disabled binary, 160

able-bodiedness: compulsory, 161; normativity of, 158; privileges of, 158-9; temporary, 160

ableism, xi, 149-65; challenging of, 163-4; cultural construction of, 155-7; definition of, 156; studies in, 158

Aboriginal people, 108,122-3

academics, privilege of, 32

accountability, models of, 182-3

additive analyses, 19-20

affluenza, 49

African experience, validation of, 54-6

Afrocentricity, 55-6

ageism, 155

aggression advantage, 88

aid, alternative to, 48

allies of oppressed groups, 180

anger, constructive use of, 186

anti-colonialism, 52-4,58

anti-gay attitudes, 133-4,138

anti-globalisation struggles, 6o

anti-Islamic views, 45

anti-oppressive theory, critique of, 21-4

anti-racism, 5, 125,127

Australia: Aboriginal reconciliation in, 114; discussion of whiteness in, 115; labour movement in, 68

Australian Association of Social Workers, 112

beauty, cultural views of, 151

black nationalism, 169

black women, 55

bodily normativity, 159

body: as form of social currency,  159-60; interest in, 150; multiplicity and fluidity of bodies, 164

Bourdieu, P., 26-7, 65

Bush, George, 45

capitalism, and class division, 118

caste, 52-3

class, 79-81, 143; concept of, marginalised, 69, 70, 71; construction of, 65; constructs identities, 85; impact of, on women’s lives, 19; intersectionality of, 79; marginalisation of concept of, 65; non-fluidity of, 69; personal narrative of, 6z-4; theorising of, 64-5

class analysis, reinvigoration of, 83

class-based oppression, 81-3

class consciousness: critical, 63-4; negative, 72

class elitism, 62-85

class mobility, 64

class privilege, benefits of, 77

class relations, challenging of, 70

classism, 81-3; meanings of, 82

coalitions, against oppression and privilege, 181-2

cognitive justice, 51

colonialism, 51,52,53, 54; research as part of, 57

colour blindness,

conscientisation, collective, 187

consciousness, individual, changing of, 170

consumption: conspicuous, 49-51; in North, reduction of, 50

corporate accountability, 61

critical psychology, ix

critical reference groups, 183

critical sociology, ix

222 Index

cross-class alliances, 78-9

cultural capital, 65

cultural competence, iii

cultural institutions controlled by men, 99

cultural studies approach, 64

decentring of Westerners, 59

decolonisation, 44, 48, 51, 60; of methodologies, 58

democratic manhood, 107

development, poverty of, 46-9

dialogue: across difference and inequality, 176-8; right to, 177

difference, 71; devaluation of, 13; in coalitions, AI; listening across, 178-9; seen as essential, 14

disability: as product of capitalist relations, 152; defining of, 152; fear of, 162.; feminist writings on, 154; gendered nature of, 154; intersectionality of, 154-5; seen as personal failing, 150; social model of, 151-4,157,164; tragedy model of, 152, 1624 use of term non-disabled, 160

disability awareness programmes, 164

disability people’s movement, 153

disability studies, 144, 158, 164

disabled people: non-homogeneity of, 154; use of term, 152

disablism: aversive, 156; challenge to, 164; cultural construction of, 155-7; definition of, 155-6

discrimination, concept of, 4

distribution, politics of, 84

diversity awareness, 111-12

diversity industry, 112

division of labour, in family, 98, 1o6

dominance: challenging of, xi; doing of, 33-5; internalisation of, 25-7, 76-8; Northern, 58-9; reproduction of, 7

domination: definition of, 26; matrix of, 21; relations of, 3-16

Dulwich Family Therapy Centre (Adelaide), 183, 186

ecological footprint, 49-50

ecosystem, destruction of, 50

Ehrenreich, Barbara, Fear of Falling…, 74

elite, concept of, 3, 7

elite domination, approval of, 7-8

elite studies, vii, 7-9

elitism, compatibility with democracy, 8

emancipatory interests, development of, 174^–5

emancipatory participatory action research, 183

embodiment of privilege, 149-65

entitlement: discourse of, 95-7; sense of, 15-16

epistemicide, 51

epistemological humility, 60

epistemological imperialism, 12.8

epistemological multiversity, 60

epistemological privilege, 5I-2

equal rights, and gay politics, I41-2

equalisation of incomes, 106

ethical listening, 179

ethical resistance, 174

ethnocentrism, 42, 53

Eurocentrism, 39-61; moving beyond, 43-4; term questioned, 44

fair trade, 60

false consciousness, 5

Family Centre (New Zealand), 182-3

feminine, denial of, 92

feminism, vii-viii, 19, 22, 71, 79, 80, 86, 106-7, 125, 139, 145, 158, 169, 179; black, 19; critique of, 18; engagement with psychoanalytic theory, 92; lesbian, 140; men’s support for, 29; postcolonial, 18; radical, 17-18, 80; second-wave, 5, 86; support for, 6

feminist standpoint theory, 27-31

fitness, preoccupation with, 120

foreign aid, question of effectiveness of, 47-8

Fraser, N., 24^–5

gay constructivism, 12.9

gay essentialism, 129

gay liberation, 5, 169

gay marriage, 140-1

gay politics, 140-2

gay rights, 147

gay theory, 12.9

gender, 54, 106,118 143; as code word for women, 13; intersectionality with whiteness, 117

gender difference, 87-90

gender domination, 24, 139-40

gender equality, 107

gender order, 86-107; theorisation of, 97-100

gender role beliefs, 142

gender studies, 87

gendering, of class, 79-81

globalisation, 57; challenge to, 60

greenhouse emissions, reduction of, 50

habitus, concept of, 26-7

health and appearance, as obsession, 150

hegemonic consciousness, 22

heteronormativity, 24, 136, 146

heteroprivilege, 128-48

heterosexism, 24, 134, 155

heterosexism awareness, 144; training workshops, 144

heterosexual privilege, 137-9

heterosexual/homosexual binary, 140-1,144

heterosexuality, xi, 34, 81, 99,

178; advantages accruing to, 137; and gender domination, 139-40; and masculinity, 142-3; compulsory, 136, 139, 143, 144; concept of, recent invention of, 131; construction of, 130-3; critique of, 141; deconstruction of, 12.8; destabilising of, 144; institutionalised, 128-48; intersectionality of, 143-4; non-homogeneity of category, 138; normalisation of, 130-I; pluralising of, 146; privileges of, 148; queering of, 146-8; reconstructing of, 106, 145-6; theorising of, 129-30

Index 223

heterosexuality questionnaire, 132-3

hierarchy, perceived naturalness of, 14

Hill-Collins, Patricia, 19, 21

homo-hatred, 135

homophobia, x, 6, 13, 17, 23, 55, 128, ¹33^–4, 135, 142, 143, 144, 146, 152; among black people, 22; internalisation of, 5

homosexuality: construction of, 130, 140; natural, 129; regulation of, 130

housework: division of, 106; men’s participation in, 86, 91

identities, multiple, 181

identity, 71; in communal space, 54

identity politics, 18, 72

ideological hegemony, 5

ideological justifications for social orders, 185

Ignatieff, Noel, 120

illness, seen as personal failing, 150

impairment, 156, 160; definition of, 153-4; fluctuating experience of, 160

imperial knowledge, 42

imperialism, 46, 57; concept of, 39-40

indigenous knowledge, 56-8

inequality: costs of, 3; in world systems theory, 39; legitimation of, 4; mobilisation against, 7; naturalness of, 14-15; responsibility for, 171

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 40, 48, 49

intersectionality, xi, 18-24, 186; in construction of African identity, 56; of class, 79; of disability, 154-5; of privilege, 35; whiteness and, 117-19

Jefferson, Thomas,x

Johnson, A., 137

Kimmel, Michael, 184^–5

knowledge, ecology of, 51

knowledge systems, diversity in, 51

224 Index

Latham, Mark, 68

listening, 180; as condition of democracy, 179

local knowledge, promotion of, 44

male crisis discourse, 103-4

male domination, 17-18

male entitlement, 104; internalisation of, 92

male privilege see privilege,

male male violence, 9, 15, 31, 86, 89, 90, 96, 98; prevention of, 183

marginalised, role of, 5

Marx, Karl, 73

Marxism, 17-18, 24, 26, 28, 53, 55, 56, 64^–5, 66^–7, 73, 75, 79, 80, 84, 92, 118, 143, 169

masculinity, 85-107, 142-3; complicit, 89-90; costs of, 103; dimensions of, 88; hegemonic, 89 (unlearning of, 119); hierarchy of, 90; institutionalised, 88; non-Western, 102; research, internationalization of, 102; social construction of, 87-90; straight queer, 147-8

masculinity studies, white Western bias in, 59

May-Machunda, P., 158

McIntosh, Peggy, 9, II, 77, 116-17

men: as agents of women’s oppression, 80-1; coalitions with feminist women, 181-2; deny reality of privilege, 102; natural entitlement of, 15; profeminist, 178, 180; resistance to change, 104-5; social divisions among, 101-3

Men Against Sexual Assault (MASA), 180, 182

men’s groups, 86

meritocracy, myth of, 67-70

Messerschmidt, J., 33

micro-enterprise lending, 60

middle class: activism of, 72, 78; black, 79; concept of, 67-8; new, 73; privilege of, 76-8; radicalism of, 75

Mills, C. Wright, 7-8

missionaries, 55

modernisation, 41, 46, 47

multi-issue coalitions, 169

negative identity, construction of, 175

neo-liberalism, 39

neo-Marxism, 53

new social movements, 71, 72

non-disablement, pathology of, 161-3

normal, politics of, 141

North, division and inequality in, 61

Occidentalism, 45

oppositional consciousness, 5; differential, 6

oppression, 3-16; challenging of, 172; class-based, not discussed in US, 66; complicity in, 186; consequences of, 82; elimination of, 170; interlocking, 34; internalisation of, 5; non-class, 79; personal experience of, 173; racial, 56; reproduction of, 4; responsibility for, 171; self-identification as oppressed, 186; single cause theories of, 17-18; social construction of, 84; strategies for challenging of, 169; theories of, 83

oppressor, concept of, 171

Orientalism, 44^–5

othering, process of, 13

partnership model of social organisation, 185-6

patriarchal dividend, 86-107, 117

patriarchy, 6, 20, 30, 81, 88, 92, 93, 145; and control, 96; and systemic domination, 93-5; challenge to, 107; critique of, 105

patriarchy awareness workshops, 86, 180, 182

Peavey, F., 179

pedagogy of the privileged, 171-4

phallocentrism, 93, 95

physical capital, 151

physical difference, fear of, 162

political economy, 62-85

positionality, viii, 27^–31, 39, 40, 58, 62, 109, 147, 149, 176, 186; of the privileged, 177

post-Marxism, 71

postcolonial studies, 52-4

poststructuralism, 53

poverty, vi; link to affluence in West, 49; reduction of, 48

privilege, x, 3-16, 176; able-bodied, 143-4 (construction of, 157-60); access to, 21-22; accompanied by oppression, 23; advantages of, 9; and positionality, 27-31; and sense of entitlement, 15-16; appropriated, 26; as function of power, 7; as structured action, 33-5; challenging of, xii, 184, 185, 187; concept of, 7; damaging effects of, 174; defence of, 28; education about, 172; embodiment of, 149-65; emotions associated with, 123; epistemological, 51-2; generation of, 6; globalising of, 40-1; heterosexual, 137-9, 178; historically specific, 20; institutionalisation of, 170; internalisation of, 25-7; investigation of, 35; invisibility of, 6, 9-12; male, vi, 27, 86, 200-1, 155, 175, 178; middle-class, 76-8; moral humility required, 178, 179; naturalisation of, 12-15 (challenging of, 170-1); of academics, 32; of activists, 172; of class, 83 (benefits of, 77); of men (consequences of, 103-4; theorising of, 90-3); of silence, 31; outside speakers for, 30; personal, interrogation of, 32; relinquishing of, 27, 183-5; reproduction of, challenged from within, 169; requires recognition, 115; social construction of, 14; social dynamics of, 17-35; strategies for challenging of, 169; to be made visible, 4; Western, 49; white, 43, 100, 111 (complexity of, 127); recognition of, 115-17; rejection of, 121,relinquishing of, vii, ix, 122; resistance to change, 123-4) see also pedagogy of the privileged

Index 225

professional work, proletarianisation of, 75-6

professionals, 64: class politics of, 62; contradictory class location of, 74; hybrid identity of, 76; in service occupations, 75; politics of, 72-6; theorisation of, 73

proletariat, as force for political change, 62

pronouns, reflecting power relations, viii

queer theory, 140-I, 144

queering, of heterosexuality, 146-8

race: as ‘other’, 111-12; impact on women’s lives, 19; invisibility of, 10; social construction of, 108; theory of, 71

race cognisance, 113

race relations, teaching of, 112

race theory, critical, 117

race to innocence, II, 173

race traitor, 120 see also traitorous identities

racial formations, 108-27

racialised gaze, 114-15

racialising of class, 79-81

racism, 6, II, 13, 20, 22, 79, 108, 109, 155; as prejudice, 109-10; as prejudice plus power, 111; aversive, 111; experience of, 126-7; institutionalised, 127; levels of, 121; see also anti-racism

radical scholars, challenge to, 32

recognition, politics of, 84

reconciliation circles (Australia), 186

redistribution, theory of, 24^–5

relations of ruling, 170

research epistemologies, critique of, 57

respectability, as normative standard, 77

revolutionary force, 62

Rich, Adrienne, 139

Rochlin, Martin, 132

Rudd, Kevin, 115, 122-3

226 Index

Said, Edward, Orientalism, 44-6

self-interest, 174-5

Sennett, Richard, and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, 63

sexism, vi, II, 13, 17, 23, 55, 93; and coercive control, 95-7; use of term, 4

silence, privilege of, 31

slavery, abolition of, x

social dominance orientation, 28

social mobility, 67-70, 78

social sciences, perceived as universal, 58

social theory, ethnocentricity of, 58

social work, professional imperialism in, 57

social workers: as working middle class, 74-5; code of ethics for, 112

socialism, 66-7

Southern theory, 58-9

speaking for others, 30

stratification theory, 64

subaltern studies, 52; impact of, 53

subjectivity: different understanding of, 56; reconstruction of, 184

subsidies, agricultural, 48

symmetrical reciprocity, 178

third way approach, 68

traitorous identities, 29-30; construction of, 175-6

transnational capital, 39

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), fall of, 66

unionisation, 76

unmarked status,10

‘untouchables’, in India, 52.

victims, blaming of, 5

violence, male see male violence

wealth, inequality of, 46

Weber, Max, 64, 73

Weinberg, George, Society and the Healthy Homosexual, 133

West: as divided entity, 46; challenge to supremacy of, 42-3; idea of, 41; opposed to Orient, 45; seen as pioneering modern world, 42

Western dominance, 39-61

Western model of progress, 47

Western social work: challenge to, 57; models of, 55

white identity, autonomous, 119

white man’s burden, 48

white supremacy, 108-2.7

whiteliness, 121

whiteness: and intersectionality, 117-19; as invisible norm, 113; as privilege, 109, 125; connected to Western dominance, 43; critical, 114; defence of, 123-4; diversity within, 118; doing and undoing of, 12.0-2; internalisation of, 121; intersectionality with heterosexuality, 143-4; list of advantages of, 116; mediated by gender, 118; politics of, 124-6; positive identity of, 120; recognition of privilege of, 115-17; relation with heterosexuality, 143; theorisation of, 115; transforming of, 119-2.0; visibility of, 112-15 see also privilege, white

whiteness studies, 113, 12.4-5

Wittig, Monique, The Straight Mind, 139

women: autonomy of, 106; earnings of, 98-9; experience of oppression, 79-81; notion of privilege of, 23; struggles of, in USA, x; subordination of, 97;  white, privilege of, 18;  working-class, 82

working class, 83; living conditions of, 69; new, 73; radicalism of, decline of, 70; white, and racism, 119

World Bank, 40, 48, 49

World Social Forum, 25, 61

world travelling, 60, 176

youth, eternal, fantasy of, 162

Why Ridicule Works

Ridicule works for two reasons. First, it displays a lack of fear. Second, it takes a position of superiority. When one person is confronted with another who simultaneously exhibits both contempt and dismissiveness the result is to feel both vulnerable and unimportant.

The physically weak can through other means become valued and protected members of society. Those who are able to inflict injury or deprivation on others will find sooner rather than later some acolytes and followers who will discover we have all manner of personal and intellectual gifts. Those who would be ugly and stupid if poor and without influence are transformed into individuals of “striking features” and “hidden depths”.

Ridicule is a form of aggression which simultaneously denies fearsomeness and relevance. Those who are ridiculed are being told they are without consequence. It combines both personal and social rejection. The personal rejection is the denial of the ability of the other person to instill fear in us. Fear is now generally understood as the most powerful of the primary emotions — perhaps even the first to evolve at all — and so dismissing fear as a salient emotion makes attack possible. Social rejection usually implies a form of uselessness. Useless people will not be missed. People who are not seen has having any meaningful contribution to the community can be discarded without material concern. Ridicule is evidence of the irrelevance, the expendabilty, and the vulnerability of the ridiculed.

It is also a form of communication which takes place in a particular social and psychological context.

In the light of the Charlie Hedbo massacres we are confronted again with the evidence of how irritated people get when their cherished beliefs are held up to ridicule.

Ridicule, mockery, satire, and irony are all devices for expressing dissatisfaction with an idea or a lifestyle or some set of choices.  These options are equally hurtful in their emotional impact but they are all forms of disapproval.

Ridicule can be derived from our aesthetic choices (“You don’t like that kind of music, do you?”),  our selection of social affiliations (“Why do you belong to a club full of argumentative fools?”),  our personal style or wardrobe (“That outfit makes you look ridiculous.”) and endless other options which are part of our daily life. They are things we can control and relate to our choices.  If the way we are treated by virtue of these choices is negative enough we either change the way we present ourselves in public or we find another group of people who share our preferences.

Other kinds of ridicule address our social identity and is something much less easy to escape. Ancestry and biology dictate our native language, our sex, our race, our age, and in most cases our religion.  These attributes also give us our initial sense of how we fit into the social world.  Are we members of a group generally disliked or are we members of a group seen in a positive light by other groups? Are we entitled to deference or special privileges? Are we born into servitude and expected to know our place?

Ridicule is particularly hurtful to those individuals who have no source of support or identity outside the existing social context. Those who accept a transcendent view of the world, those from other cultures who look at their critics as at least different and most likely inferior, those who come from cultures which are strongly individualistic in their treatment of people rather than collectivist,  and those who have the ability to see the viewpoint of their critics as and internally coherent position are all better able to deal with it.

This last point, the ability to see the worldview of those doing the mocking as internally coherent, is a particularly interesting alternative. When taken to its logical conclusion it can lead to questions about common ground and shared aspects of reality. If ridicule leads to dialogue then new options present themselves.

In “The Rhetoric” Aristotle described three major dimensions of disputation: appeals to emotion, appeals to ethnic customs, and appeals to reason. The first one gives us such things as the appeal to fear. The second one gives us appeals to tribalism and ethnocentrism. The third one is different. By its very nature the appeal to reason is an appeal to that which is presumably self-evident. It is an appeal to that which is universal. It is an appeal to that which we all share.

Appeals to reason involve the need for mutually consistent assumptions. If reason is to be applied to the world in which we live — to “reality” — then we will also need to appeal to evidence. The evidence must ideally be something which is also shared. This shared evidence is harder to get than at first we imagine but it is what we mean in the final analysis by the term “objective fact”. What “objectivity” means is a larger topic than this post will allow. For now it is enough to consider that ridicule may, in the proper social and intellectual context, lead to reasoned dialogue.

Now to move the boundaries — the margins — of this comment.

It began with the experience of being ridiculed and only left as an inference the motives for the ridicule.

What if the ridicule was deemed to be the only reasonable response to a refusal to engage in reasoned dialogue? What initiated the ridicule in the first place? Was it mere emotional bullying? Or thuggish ethnocentrism? Or was it a response to the refusal to enter into reasoned dialogue?

It ended with the speculation about responding to ridicule with reasoned dialogue.

Honest, complete and full conversations may result in concluding the only logical option is for separation. It may on the other hand reveal the potential for mutually beneficial coexistence.

Jihad Comes to Paris

The news media are all filled with outrage and fear following the killing of 12 members of the Charlie Hedbo staff and the wounding of seven more. The people killed were cartoonists and writers who had over the years offended the sensibilities of Islam and made unflattering caricatures of Mohammad and contemporary Islamic leaders. The offices were firebombed in 2011 after naming Prophet Mohammad as “Editor-in-Chief”.

Access to the offices where the killings took place was gained by waiting for one of the staff members to pick up her daughter from daycare and then forcing her to let them in. By hiding under a desk she managed to avoid injury.

Two of the killers were born and raised in France. The police identified as Hamyd Mourad and brothers Said Kouachi and Cherif Kouachi as the killers and are conducting a national search for them.

This attack comes just two days after demonstrations in Germany by the Pegida group to protest the growing islamisation of Europe. The Pegida demonstrations were denounced by celebrities and politicians as “xenophobic” and “intolerant”. Those opposing Pegida outnumbered those in the anti-islamisation protest.

One of the more common themes in the Western media reaction is the phrase “the pen is mightier than the sword”.

Well.

No,

it’s not.

As Chairman Mao so perspicaciously observed, “power comes out of the barrel of a gun” and what all of our pen-wielding warriors will be demanding from now on are gun-toting bodyguards.

Statements like “the pen is mightier than the sword” and “power comes out of the barrel of a gun” are cliches. Slogans are at best like ideal laws in science. They only apply in textbooks where the reader is told what aspects of reality to ignore.

Other slogans or cliches draw our attention to this. “The Devil Is In The Details” or “When the rubber hits the road” remind us not to forget about context. Experts are people who not only know the rules but also know the contexts in which the rules do not precisely apply. Youngsters who know “F=ma” know jumping out of an airplane is a bad idea. Experts who know about air friction know skydiving is fun. Yesterday, for example, an airplane in New Zealand crashed. Nobody was hurt. Why? It was filled with six skydivers and six passengers. They all jumped out. So did the pilot. Had things not gone well the death toll would have been 13 and the world media would be running stories on how terrible it all was.

The general reason people say pens are mightier than swords relates to the role of communication in human society. It relates to the “power” of ideas.

But what is “power”?

In physics class we were given a little poem to remember the formula for electrical power. “Twinkle twinkle little star, “.

Which almost worked for us but one classmate blurted out

“Little star up in the sky, “.

Thus ruining it for everyone. And now for you, too.

Power also has a definitions for its mechanical manifestation.

Sometimes electrical power can be turned into mechanical power. This is known as “transduction”.

When the pen is used to motivate people into either picking up their guns and killing cartoonists (or picking up their guns to protect cartoonists) or to get everyone to put down their guns and resolve their disputes with words and pictures, then we are witnessing was is called “the power of ideas”.

Another kind of power.

Ideas are transmitted through words, deeds, and gestures.

And images.

The images used to transmit an idea must themselves present the idea either through representations or through icons. The are “communicative acts”.

The Parisian jihadis justified their actions by noting the ideas being communicated by the cartoons were deeply offensive and the appropriate action was communicate their displeasure with another communicative act. The act of killing the cartoonists.

The same cartoons which “communicated” the contempt the cartoonists had for Islam also “communicated” to the jihadists the need to kill the cartoonists in a manner which made their deaths iconographically significant. Both groups were “sending messages”.

If we look at these killings as forms of communication and if the message they were attempting to communicate was their degree of displeasure with the Charlie Hedbo worldview then we place these actions in the realm of “rational conduct”.

About a century and a half ago, Europe was in the grip of ongoing unrest because of the displacement of the working class by the industrial revolution. In 1871 the Paris Commune and one of its leading figures, the anarchist Errico Malatesta and others advocated what they called the “propaganda of the deed”. Those who followed this idea became the assassins, bombers, and rioters of their age.  So violent were the anarchists the US government banned their entry in the Immigration Act of 1903.

In other words, they were banned for what they believed, for their worldview.

The idea of “propaganda by the deed” was born in Paris in the 1870s and was practised in Paris once again in 2015.

The second half of the 19th Century was a period of great dislocation for people and most of these dislocations were caused, eventually, by ideas. The ideas of the Industrial Revolution created what Marx would contemptuously call the “lumpen proletariate” and the ideas of ethnic nationalism which were in their own way reflections of the loss of the centrality of Christianity as the dominant worldview led to Zionism, the Unification of Germany and Italy, Pan Slavism, and the realisation that something we now call “culture” is an idea which aids us in placing ourselves in the world and in our community.

For the next 100 years Europe and the West would struggle with the psychological requirements for identity and belonging and the undeniable impact of the ideas we call “science” and “rationalism”.

Now, with Europe again on the cusp of another industrial revolution and its implications for social relationships and communications, we find another revolution which was unthinkable to most (but not all) of those in the 19th Century. We are striving for mastery of our own genetic makeup. Every conceivable pillar of identity is now under attack by our culture.

This time, in addition to the members of our own culture who are facing redundancy and exclusion, our borders have within them people whose cultural and historical preparations are even less tailored to cope with these changes than our own is.

Islam, after all, is a religion which regulates almost all aspects of life. One is, for example, to cut one’s fingernails every two weeks and one’s toenails every month. It is a religion which in theory at least is based on a set of unchanging rules for the running of society.

One of the great oversimplifications of Western Idealism, one of the great slogans is the statement “all cultures are equal”.

There are two issues which arise here. The first is simply “what do we mean by ‘culture’ anyway?” and the second is the more thorny “if all cultures are equal then what does the term ‘multiculturalism’ signify?”

Each of these statements can be justified. What cannot be done is to make them justifiable in the same context. When we talk about these two viewpoints they are in fact different viewpoints. They occupy different “points” from which the world is perceived.

Recall the different ideas of “power” encountered earlier. It is possible to argue that the pen is “mightier” (more powerful) than the sword (or a gun) in one context but in another one sees the truth of the relationship between guns and power.

The gun has the power of compulsion. The pen has the power of persuasion.  Failing to get the contexts sorted out properly leads us into one of the most common logical fallacies in daily life. Aristotle called it the fallacy of the fourth term. Today it is often termed a “category error” and another term for it is “equivocation”.

In mathematics and science it’s a mistake caused by sloppiness or ignorance.  In law it represents a tactic open to both sides in an adversarial dispute. In art and literature it provides the ambiguity needed for the misunderstandings in which both tragedy and comedy see their plots advance. When found in the public policies of democratic states it is seen as hypocrisy, bias, preferential treatment, and special privileges.

Just two days before the killings at Charlie Hebdo, the Wall Street Journal’s “Weekend Interview” was titled “How to Fight the Campus Speech Police: Get a Good Lawyer”. The same people who now speak in stirring support of “free speech” may well be those who also will, without any hesitation, proscribe “hate speech”, “sexist language”, “islamophobia” and “homophobia”. They may well also denounce “eurocentrism”, “racism”, “sexism”, “anti-semitism”, “whiteness”, and “patriarchy” while they’re at it.  In Canada the graduates of Trinity Western’s school of law are not permitted to do their articles either in British Columbia or in Ontario because their university has a code of conduct which prohibits sexual activity between unmarried people. Two days after the Charlie Hebdo killings groups in Western Democracies were calling for the abolition of their various “hate speech” laws.

Nobody should really expect any culture anywhere or at any time to defend absolutely free speech. It would permit libel, slander, and all manner of misrepresentation. It would make society basically unworkable. The idea of being able to express one’s thoughts “freely” was at the outset not intended to be a way to flood the town square with kiddie porn or patent falsehoods about other members of the community. Originally it was meant to hold those who were in positions of authority and trust to account. The right to free speech was defined at the beginning as the right to criticise the government. It was related to what we now call “transparency”. It was seen as necessary for the kind of social harmony which is only possible in a society which is as free from corruption as is humanly possible. Societies work best when the people in it believe their fellow citizens are all carrying out their responsibilities as honestly and competently as possible (whether because they are inherently virtuous or they fear the shame of being shown to be dishonest and incompetent) and the openness and transparency must also extend to the reasons for certain people being given the authority they possess.  Many societies have mixtures of aristocratic and meritocratic forms of legitimacy but they too are governed by the need for transparency.

And this brings us back to “culture”. When we look at France’s Front National or Britain’s UKIP or the Dutch Party for Freedom we encounter people who believe their respective cultures are not congenial with the culture of Islam. When people in those countries take up the mantle of multiculturalism and denounce Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders as xenophobes and islamophobes another idea of culture is being given to us.

What is “culture” anyway? Can both of these groups be correct in the same way that both the statements relating pens to power are also correct? Is there a contextual understanding which will allow us to place into a common framework the two (or three if we include Islam) contending worldviews?

Anthropologists speak of culture in several ways. When they examine archaeological finds they are primarily looking at the “material” culture of a society. This gives an idea of technology, of economy, and of various approaches to social status. Examining burials can show some clues as to the attitudes towards death and eternity.

A society which has written records can give us insights into their worldviews, their ways of understanding the human condition, their ideas.  If cultures are not only shared languages and shared economic undertakings but also shared ideas then multiculturalism must not only confront technological and linguistic dissimilarities but also a possible lack of agreement on ideas. Some of those ideas could possibly involve the most basic tenets of how a society is to be organised.

Cartoons are little more than lines on paper. They are iconographic representations of events, individuals, and possibly through allusion to metaphors, of ideas. They are not only highly symbolic forms of communication, they can only have relevance if the iconography of the cartoon is shared. It is only when the iconography is shared that additional modifications to the way the cartoon is rendered can make it funny, informative, insightful, offensive, and so on.  They occupy a level in the hierarchy of communicative actions which is presumably inaccessible to frogs, dogs, and most likely even chimps.

As such they can engage that part of human consciousness which is most unique to humans. It is that same level of consciousness in which our ideas of the meaning and purpose of life, of the distinction between law and justice, and the abstractions we call mathematics and philosophy are located. The content of particular cartoons may be frivolous or absurd or boring to us but the ability we have to make such determinations is given to us by our highest intellectual capacities. And it is from those highest intellectual capacities we apprehend what we generally take to be the answers to the most important questions of our existence. The most resilient and advanced forms of culture provide not only the technological means for daily physical survival, not only the patterns for the organisation of how the necessary tasks of communal life, and not only the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable conduct in communal dealings, but they also provide concepts of individual virtue and the moral justification for the continuation of the community’s patterns itself. They may also extend the definition of the community’s relationship to other communities and justify (or even mandate) everything from peaceful co-existence to the need to conquer and force into submission all those which differ in their cultural interpretations.

Here we encounter that part of human culture which is essentially confined to human consciousness. This is the aspect of culture which allows us to synchronise our individual sense of self, our sense of identity, our experience of existence, with those around us. This is the source of those shared understandings which give us our place in history as well as our role in the present.  This is the genesis of those values and behaviours which make it possible for different communities to live both distinctly as themselves while harmoniously dealing with one another. It is also the genesis of those values and behaviours which make it legitimate for one community to exterminate, subjugate, or expel another.

Analogies are not proofs but they can be useful for illustration. Keeping in mind that “cultures” are not “atoms” it may be beneficial to use this as an analogy.

Each culture has some core values which cannot be removed without changing it. An atomic nucleus is defined ultimately by reference to the number of protons it has. Changing that number invariably changes it to a different atom. Atoms can have different isotopes and different levels of ionisation but as long as they have the same number of protons there is some definable group to which they invariably and exclusively belong.

When we confront secular French society we find words like “secularism”, “rationalism”, “democracy”, and “tolerance”. When we look at Islam we discover Sharia law which has words like “submission”, “ummah”, “caliphate”, “jizya”, “jihad”, “taqqiya” and rules on how to deal with “unbelievers” and “polytheists”.

Extending this atomic-nucleus analogy allows the posing of the following questions:

First, would a dialogue based on the comparative evaluation of the various cultural core values be possible? Would it lead to a greater understanding of what kinds of state and what kinds of state laws could accommodate particular cultural orientations? This may lead to one or all sides having to surrender various aspects of their collective life and have them excluded from “the public square”.

Second, would it be advisable to augment existing immigration laws for various countries to go beyond the present educational, occupational, and physical attributes and look at cultural values as well?

Third, will we find that only some groups cultures are able to co-exist peacefully for multiple generations with one another?

Fourth, are there some cultures which must dwell alone?

As these words are written the news reports inform me the jihadists in Paris, like their victims, are dead.  The consequences of their actions live on.